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PETER HEFT
ABSTRACT: In “Logic and Conversation,” H. P. Grice 
posits that in conversations, we are “always-already” 
implying certain things about the subjects of our words 
while abiding by certain rules to aid in understanding. It 
is my view, however, that Grice’s so-called “cooperative 
principle” can be analyzed under the traditional 
Heideggerian dichotomy of ready-to-hand and present-
at-hand wherein language can be viewed as a “mere” 
tool that sometimes breaks. Ultimately, I contend that 
the likening of language to a tool allows for a more 
robust understanding of it and conversational failures, 
while ontologically recategorizing language as an 
object of sorts.
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25INTRODUCTION
In the following paper, I will attempt to analyze our 
usage of language and subsequently rethink the ontology 
of it by utilizing H. P. Grice’s work on conversational 
implicature and Martin Heidegger’s famous tool-analysis. 
Specifically, I will utilize Grice’s account of conversational 
implicature in “Logic and Conversation” and Heidegger’s 
account of the broken tool in Being and Time to make the 
case that our use of language can be understood under 
the traditional Heideggerian dichotomy of ready-to-
hand/present-at-hand.1 Indeed, it is my contention that 
Heidegger’s tool-analysis has implications far beyond 
understanding Dasein’s usage of what are traditionally 
considered “tools.” In what follows, I will argue that when 
people engage in conversation and nothing “goes wrong,” 
their relationship with language is one of readiness-to-
hand. Conversely, when one (or more) maxims of the 
Gricean cooperative principle are flouted—that is to 
say, something “goes wrong”—the language being used 
becomes foregrounded, and we thus enter a present-
at-hand relationship with it. Understanding language 
as a tool, in the Heideggerian sense, allows us not only 
to examine the ways in which language works, but also 
to create an ontological parallel between “tools” and 
conceptual apparatuses that ultimately helps us flatten 
ontology and rethink the existential status of objects.
GRICE AND CONVERSATIONAL 
IMPLICATURE
In “Logic and Conversation,” H. P. Grice makes 
the case that when humans engage in everyday 
discursive interactions, they are abiding by an implicit 
and assumed set of rules governing how they ought to 
talk to and understand one another. For Grice, the so-
called “cooperative principle” is implicitly invoked in 
conversations as a tool to allow humans to make sense of 
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what the other person is saying without requiring constant 
clarification.2 Indeed, according to Grice, as we talk we 
tend to abide by certain maxims that help make sure that 
what we are saying is clear and distinct. Specifically, Grice 
isolates four fundamental categories under which various 
maxims fall: quantity, quality, relation, and manner. 
Under the category of quantity, Grice argues that there 
are two vital maxims: be as informative as possible and 
do not provide too much information. For quality, the 
maxims are that one ought not utter something that one 
believes to be false and that one ought not state things 
for which one lacks evidence. For relation, the obvious 
maxim is to be relevant. And, finally, for manner, the four 
maxims are as follows: avoid obscurity, avoid ambiguity, 
be brief, and be orderly.3 For Grice, not only do the 
aforementioned categories and maxims structure how 
humans use language, but following them—and, indeed, 
flouting them in strategic instances—is vital to the project 
of discourse. Specifically, when one abides by the maxims, 
ceteris parabus, the semantic content of a sentence is taken 
at face value. That is to say, when the maxims are followed 
within the context of the overall conversation, statements 
such as “I am lost” and “here is a map” are interpreted 
literally. When at least one maxim is flouted, however, the 
meaning of the sentence changes, and thus it cannot be 
taken at face value.
To explore what Grice means, let us deconstruct 
a hypothetical conversation. Let us, for the sake of 
argument, say that Jane sees John’s car on the shoulder 
of a highway. If Jane asked what happened, John would 
typically report what he took to be the relevant facts in a 
non-florid manner. For Grice, most of our conversations 
follow this same theme. That being said, however, 
conversations do either intentionally or unintentionally go 
awry, and thus conversational implicature—that is to say, 
an unexpressed implication behind our words—comes 
into play. Allow me to take one of Grice’s examples 
and run with it. Suppose A and B are talking about a 
mutual friend, C, who recently got a new job. A asks 
B, “How does C like her new job?” To this query, B 
responds, “She likes it, her co-workers, and hasn’t been 
to prison yet.”4 Upon hearing such a conversation, we 
are inclined to think that something funny is going 
on as an unrelated topic—that is to say, prison—was 
brought up out of nowhere. When one or more maxims 
2 Grice, “Logic 
and Conversa-
tion,” 314.
3 Grice, “Logic 
and Conversa-
tion,” 314-15.
4 Grice, “Logic 
and Conversa-
tion,” 313.
1 H. P. Grice, 
“Logic and 
Conversa-
tion,” in The 
Philosophy of 
Language, ed. 
A. P. Martinich 
and David Sosa 
(Oxford: Oxford 
University 
Press, 2012); 
Martin Heideg-
ger, Being and 
Time, trans. 
John Macquar-
rie and Edward 
Robinson (New 
York: Harper 
and Row, 1962).
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of the cooperative principle (in this case, the maxim of 
“be relevant”) are flouted, it becomes clear to us that 
something is being implied by the sentence and that the 
strict semantic content is not all there is; what Grice calls 
“conversational implicature” comes into play here. In the 
case of C, her psychology, for example, is implicated and 
brought forward insofar as we, as on-lookers, now begin 
to question whether C is prone to behavior that is likely 
to get her sent to prison, has had previous issues with 
co-workers, etc. Our understanding of the conversation 
shifts from the mere semantic content of the words uttered 
by A and B to a ghostly phantasm hovering behind the 
conversation. We no longer look to the meaning of the 
specific words to guide our quest for understanding, but 
rather we try to parse the words used to understand what 
implications they may hold and what those implications 
tell us about the subject of the sentence.
What this means for Grice is that language is 
used in at least two different ways: the first is a strictly 
semantic way, and the second is a way where facts about 
the subject of the sentence are implied. In the former, 
our use of language is of second nature. That is to say, 
during conversations we do not focus on language as such, 
rather we just use it without thinking about the rules 
that govern language. In the latter, our use of language 
is foregrounded; we suddenly notice semantic oddities 
in our discourse, and we are forced to think about what 
we mean when we say certain things and whether the 
words we hear have a hidden meaning behind them. In 
the case of a conversation where one or more maxims of 
the cooperative principle are flouted, we enter a moment 
of confusion where language breaks down and our 
conversations must be reconstructed. In this sense, the 
flouting of various maxims of the cooperative principle 
behave, as we shall see, like broken tools. To better 
understand the ontology of broken tools, we must turn to 
Martin Heidegger’s famous tool-analysis.
HEIDEGGER AND THE BROKEN 
HAMMER
In Heidegger’s discussion of entities encountered 
in the world—which is explored in his magnum opus, 
Being and Time—he takes note of a peculiar feature of the 
way Dasein interact with objects in the world. For our 
purposes, we will understand Dasein to mean ‘humans’ 
and shall use the two interchangeably (much to the 
chagrin of Heidegger scholars). For Heidegger, we do 
not typically interact with entities on a cognitive level, 
but rather we interact with them in a subterranean and 
primordial fashion.5 In other words, when we utilize 
objects, we tend not to focus on the object as such as we 
are using it, but instead simply use the object for a given 
end, thereby causing the object to recede from view. 
When using a hammer to nail shingles onto a house, 
for example, we do not notice the hammer as we are 
striking the nail; rather the hammer withdraws from our 
cognition and exists in a state of what Heidegger calls 
“readiness-to-hand” wherein we rely upon a network of 
different objects all working together to achieve our goals.6 
When the object we are using malfunctions in some way, 
however, our relationship suddenly changes. We begin to 
stare at the broken tool, thus bringing it to the forefront 
of our cognition, where we grasp it differently. In contrast 
to readiness-to-hand, the broken object is grasped 
“thematically” and “discovered” as a tool for doing work 
that was formerly tacitly relied upon. This shift from 
readiness-to-hand to un-readiness-to-hand underscores 
what Heidegger calls “present-at-handedness,” or a 
conscious attending to objects.7 In a word, as Graham 
Harman notes, “Heidegger contends that our primary way 
of dealing with things is absence.”8
This feature of Dasein’s usage of tools—the fact that 
as we use them, they recede away from active cognition 
and into a world of subterranean relations—is of vital 
importance for understanding how humans live in the 
world. Furthermore, Heidegger’s tool-analysis does not 
just apply to “tools” as they are typically understood—that 
is to say as low-tech hardware used to complete a certain 
goal—but rather applies to all objects.9 Indeed, as I sit 
here and type this, I am silently relying upon my heart to 
continue beating, my alveoli to facilitate the exchange of 
oxygen from the air to my bloodstream, the floor upon 
which my chair sits to sustain my meager weight, etc. A 
“tool,” as understood from a Heideggerian perspective, 
is something far beyond simple, low-tech hardware but 
includes all objects upon which humans rely. 
 5 Heidegger, 
Being and Time, 
97-98. 
6 Heidegger, 
Being and Time, 
97-98.
7 Heidegger, 
Being and Time, 
102-03.
 8 Graham 
Harman, “The 
Return to 
Metaphysics 
(2011),” in Bells 
and Whistles: 
More Specu-
lative Realism 
(Washington: 
Zero Books, 
2013), 15.
9 Graham Har-
man, “Technolo-
gy, Objects and 
Things in Heide-
gger,” Cam-
bridge Journal 
of Economics 
34, no. 1 (Jan-
uary 2010): 17, 
doi:10.1093/cje/
bep021.
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While the view that Heidegger’s tool-analysis applies 
to a large swath of objects is more or less accepted, I 
want to take the analysis a bit further. Indeed, it is my 
contention that Heidegger’s tool-analysis applies not 
only to the physical objects upon which humans rely but 
also to conceptual apparatuses, such as the language that 
humans use when navigating the world. In light of this, 
I will attempt to argue, using a Gricean understanding 
of conversational implicature, that there is no ontological 
difference in kind between language as a tool and, say, 
a hammer as a tool. Given that, we must turn now to a 
discussion of what language looks like when it breaks.
WHEN LANGUAGE BREAKS
While there is no shortage of explanations about how 
language works, the question of what language is seems 
to be too large to tackle.10 It is my contention that despite 
the nuances of how, say, sense and reference work or 
what definite descriptions pick out, language is, at base, 
a tool (that is to say, an object) like any of the others 
described above; we utilize it, we rely upon it, we neglect 
it, it recedes from view, and sometimes it malfunctions. 
Indeed, much like the hammer one uses to nail shingles 
into a roof, language can be used to complete various 
tasks. For example, if one wants a book retrieved from 
another room, one can utilize imperative or interrogative 
statements to ideally get a friend to fetch the book. What 
is more interesting, however, is that, for the most part, we 
can be remarkably imprecise in our usage of language and 
still accomplish our desired goals. Expanding upon the 
previous example, let us say that the book in question is 
located upon a couch, but you mistakenly think that the 
book is on a table. When you ask your friend, “Would 
you mind grabbing the book on the table for me?” despite 
being imprecise in your usage of language insofar as there 
is, in fact, no book on the table, more often than not your 
friend will return with the book. The fact that we can be 
imprecise in our usage of language and still net positive 
results is remarkable and requiring of (sometimes very 
complex) explanation. Understanding language under 
a Heideggerian tool framework, however, allows us to 
sidestep sticky conversations about how various features of 
language work and note something different. If we view 
language as a tool, we can bracket some of the theoretical 
discussions about how language works and examine the 
ways in which it works. Indeed, viewing language as a tool 
allows us to note that under normal conditions—that is 
to say, where conversational maxims are not flouted—
language is ready-to-hand insofar as we do not notice 
the nuances of our words; rather we simply use language 
while the contours (similar to the contours of a hammer) 
recede out of view. Unless we are way off in our usage of 
language, we can be relatively inaccurate in what we are 
saying and still get the job done, as our usage of language 
is effectively second nature.
Successes of language are only marginally interesting, 
however. What is more interesting is when language 
acts like a hammer with a weak head and breaks. While 
the breakage of language is certainly not as dramatic as 
a hammer shattering when a person strikes it against 
a nail, it is nevertheless as important and unique in its 
own way. Language breaks not when we use the wrong 
word or accidentally engage in a social faux pas—if that 
were the case, we would not be able to be as imprecise as 
we are in our usage—but rather when we knowingly or 
unknowingly flout maxims of the cooperative principle in 
our conversations with other people. To examine a way in 
which language breaks, let us revive our individuals from 
above: Jane and John. If we recall, John’s car was broken 
down on the shoulder of a highway and Jane asked what 
happened. In answer to her query, Jane received a response 
that was relevant, contained the facts of the situation, 
and was not overly florid. For example, she might have 
received the following reply: “My engine is out of oil.” 
This regular usage of language would likely lead to Jane 
offering some form of assistance to John, be it a ride, a 
loan, or some other plausible action. 
Let us imagine the same situation with Jane’s same 
query, but instead suppose that John gives the following 
answer in response: “I passed a restaurant a few miles 
back.” John’s answer to Jane’s query is odd and would 
not typically be expected. Indeed, John’s answer is likely 
to not elicit the same response from Jane (namely, her 
offering to help). Rather, Jane is likely to be taken aback 
and, if she is more patient than most folks who would 
simply drive away, ask, “What?” In this scenario, language 
as a tool breaks and the semantic content of the words 
is not what is most important. Where, in the former 
10 Martinich 
and Sosa, The 
Philosophy of 
Language.
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Successes of language are only marginally interesting, 
however. What is more interesting is when language 
acts like a hammer with a weak head and breaks. While 
the breakage of language is certainly not as dramatic as 
a hammer shattering when a person strikes it against 
a nail, it is nevertheless as important and unique in its 
own way. Language breaks not when we use the wrong 
word or accidentally engage in a social faux pas—if that 
were the case, we would not be able to be as imprecise as 
we are in our usage—but rather when we knowingly or 
unknowingly flout maxims of the cooperative principle in 
our conversations with other people. To examine a way in 
which language breaks, let us revive our individuals from 
above: Jane and John. If we recall, John’s car was broken 
down on the shoulder of a highway and Jane asked what 
happened. In answer to her query, Jane received a response 
that was relevant, contained the facts of the situation, 
and was not overly florid. For example, she might have 
received the following reply: “My engine is out of oil.” 
This regular usage of language would likely lead to Jane 
offering some form of assistance to John, be it a ride, a 
loan, or some other plausible action. 
Let us imagine the same situation with Jane’s same 
query, but instead suppose that John gives the following 
answer in response: “I passed a restaurant a few miles 
back.” John’s answer to Jane’s query is odd and would 
not typically be expected. Indeed, John’s answer is likely 
to not elicit the same response from Jane (namely, her 
offering to help). Rather, Jane is likely to be taken aback 
and, if she is more patient than most folks who would 
simply drive away, ask, “What?” In this scenario, language 
as a tool breaks and the semantic content of the words 
is not what is most important. Where, in the former 
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situation, Jane could know nothing about the mechanics 
of internal combustion engines and John’s comment of 
“my engine is out of oil” could pass completely above 
her head, it would not have to affect her offer to help. 
In the latter situation, John’s usage of language becomes 
foregrounded and subject to scrutiny. Why did John say 
“I passed a restaurant a few miles back?” Is that somehow 
relevant to his current predicament? Should Jane call the 
authorities to investigate the restaurant for misdeeds? The 
conversation becomes tumultuous and must be examined. 
If one takes seriously the Gricean understanding of 
conversational implicature, while all the above are 
possible, one must make a judgement about what is being 
implied; in this case, it would seem to be that John is 
asking Jane to go out to eat with him so that he can tell 
her the story of his car troubles (hardly an intuitive use of 
language and a very roundabout way of getting a date). 
Indeed, when John flouts a maxim of the cooperative 
principle and breaks language, causing the use of it to 
become foregrounded, language takes on an ontological 
status similar to that of the broken hammer and becomes 
present-to-hand. We no longer tacitly rely upon it, but 
instead we come to view it thematically. 
Understanding language as a tool in the Heideggerian 
sense—that is to say, an object that can break and become 
foreground in Dasein’s consciousness—allows, as we have 
seen, for a more robust understanding of different ways in 
which language works. What is more important, however, 
are the ontological implications of viewing language as a 
tool akin to a hammer. Where conventional ontological 
analyses would view a hammer and language as being 
radically different in kind—indeed, one might even 
contend that one is “more real” than another—applying 
a Heideggerian framework to language and making 
sense of language (a particular instance of a universal 
conceptual apparatus) allows for an ontological shift to 
occur wherein the Being of the tool and language differs 
not in kind but in degree (if at all). This ontological shift 
helps lead to what Levi Bryant calls a “flat ontology” 
where different objects, be they physical tools, ideas, or 
conceptual apparatuses, are viewed as existing equally and 
being worthy of consideration.11 In other words, the flat, 
ontological shift allows us to maintain the position that 
a hammer is no more real than the language that we use 
to describe the hammer and that neither one is reducible 
to the other. The ultimate implication of this—one that 
stretches far beyond language and, indeed, far beyond the 
purview of this paper—is that we are now able to make 
sense both of how non-physical objects exist and how they 
are utilized, leading directly into Ian Bogost’s examination 
of “alien phenomenology,” a phenomenology where we 
can try to make sense of the existence and “experiences” 
of non-human things.12 While a different topic indeed, 
the flattening of ontology that occurs via a Heideggerian 
analysis of language is one of the many routes that leads 
into a revision of ontology and can ultimately provoke a 
rethinking of the existential status of “things.”
NEY’S INTRA-EXTRA 
OBJECTION
The linguistic theory above—what may be called 
the “tool-theory” of language—has its limits, and while 
it would be impossible for me to cover every possible 
objection and extenuating circumstance, it is prudent 
nevertheless to examine the most salient objection: one 
put forth by Alyssa Ney, an associate professor at the 
University of California Davis’ Department of Philosophy 
who works primarily in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, 
and philosophy of physics. Ney, who I am indebted to for 
raising this issue, asked me (and I summarize her words) 
the following: what are we to make of instances where all 
parties of a given conversation are privy to information 
outsiders are not?13 To be more specific, the above analysis 
has taken the form of a disinterested third-party, and thus 
we have examined various individual’s usage of language 
from afar. If we return to our characters, A and B who are 
discussing C, and try to apply the above analysis from the 
standpoint of either A or B, we might have difficulty. Indeed, 
what if A and B know some fact about C that a third-
party listener is not privy to? Perhaps, for example, A and 
B know that C may not be the most honest person—a 
fact a disinterred observer would not know. If this is 
the case, then B’s comment of “she likes [her new job], 
her co-workers, and hasn’t been to prison yet” may not 
necessarily violate a maxim of the cooperative principle. 
In our previous analysis of A and B’s conversation, we 
assumed that something funny must be occurring since 
prison, an unrelated topic, was brought up out of nowhere 
and thus, to an observer, it seemed as if language broke and 
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situation, Jane could know nothing about the mechanics 
of internal combustion engines and John’s comment of 
“my engine is out of oil” could pass completely above 
her head, it would not have to affect her offer to help. 
In the latter situation, John’s usage of language becomes 
foregrounded and subject to scrutiny. Why did John say 
“I passed a restaurant a few miles back?” Is that somehow 
relevant to his current predicament? Should Jane call the 
authorities to investigate the restaurant for misdeeds? The 
conversation becomes tumultuous and must be examined. 
If one takes seriously the Gricean understanding of 
conversational implicature, while all the above are 
possible, one must make a judgement about what is being 
implied; in this case, it would seem to be that John is 
asking Jane to go out to eat with him so that he can tell 
her the story of his car troubles (hardly an intuitive use of 
language and a very roundabout way of getting a date). 
Indeed, when John flouts a maxim of the cooperative 
principle and breaks language, causing the use of it to 
become foregrounded, language takes on an ontological 
status similar to that of the broken hammer and becomes 
present-to-hand. We no longer tacitly rely upon it, but 
instead we come to view it thematically. 
Understanding language as a tool in the Heideggerian 
sense—that is to say, an object that can break and become 
foreground in Dasein’s consciousness—allows, as we have 
seen, for a more robust understanding of different ways in 
which language works. What is more important, however, 
are the ontological implications of viewing language as a 
tool akin to a hammer. Where conventional ontological 
analyses would view a hammer and language as being 
radically different in kind—indeed, one might even 
contend that one is “more real” than another—applying 
a Heideggerian framework to language and making 
sense of language (a particular instance of a universal 
conceptual apparatus) allows for an ontological shift to 
occur wherein the Being of the tool and language differs 
not in kind but in degree (if at all). This ontological shift 
helps lead to what Levi Bryant calls a “flat ontology” 
where different objects, be they physical tools, ideas, or 
conceptual apparatuses, are viewed as existing equally and 
being worthy of consideration.11 In other words, the flat, 
ontological shift allows us to maintain the position that 
a hammer is no more real than the language that we use 
to describe the hammer and that neither one is reducible 
to the other. The ultimate implication of this—one that 
stretches far beyond language and, indeed, far beyond the 
purview of this paper—is that we are now able to make 
sense both of how non-physical objects exist and how they 
are utilized, leading directly into Ian Bogost’s examination 
of “alien phenomenology,” a phenomenology where we 
can try to make sense of the existence and “experiences” 
of non-human things.12 While a different topic indeed, 
the flattening of ontology that occurs via a Heideggerian 
analysis of language is one of the many routes that leads 
into a revision of ontology and can ultimately provoke a 
rethinking of the existential status of “things.”
NEY’S INTRA-EXTRA 
OBJECTION
The linguistic theory above—what may be called 
the “tool-theory” of language—has its limits, and while 
it would be impossible for me to cover every possible 
objection and extenuating circumstance, it is prudent 
nevertheless to examine the most salient objection: one 
put forth by Alyssa Ney, an associate professor at the 
University of California Davis’ Department of Philosophy 
who works primarily in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, 
and philosophy of physics. Ney, who I am indebted to for 
raising this issue, asked me (and I summarize her words) 
the following: what are we to make of instances where all 
parties of a given conversation are privy to information 
outsiders are not?13 To be more specific, the above analysis 
has taken the form of a disinterested third-party, and thus 
we have examined various individual’s usage of language 
from afar. If we return to our characters, A and B who are 
discussing C, and try to apply the above analysis from the 
standpoint of either A or B, we might have difficulty. Indeed, 
what if A and B know some fact about C that a third-
party listener is not privy to? Perhaps, for example, A and 
B know that C may not be the most honest person—a 
fact a disinterred observer would not know. If this is 
the case, then B’s comment of “she likes [her new job], 
her co-workers, and hasn’t been to prison yet” may not 
necessarily violate a maxim of the cooperative principle. 
In our previous analysis of A and B’s conversation, we 
assumed that something funny must be occurring since 
prison, an unrelated topic, was brought up out of nowhere 
and thus, to an observer, it seemed as if language broke and 
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B’s comment became foregrounded. Perhaps that only tells 
half of the story, however. Given this misunderstanding, it 
seems important to draw a distinction between intra- and 
extra- conversational analyses where the ontological status 
of language is mutable. 
Indeed, where intra-conversational analyses seem to 
necessarily focus on the knowledge the speakers in the 
conversation have, extra-conversational analyses seem 
to focus merely on the speakers and their interaction. In 
other words, where an intra-conversational analysis of 
A and B will consider A and B’s experiences and shared 
knowledge, an extra-conversational analysis of the same 
entities would only be able to consider the explicit 
interaction between the two parties. The implication of 
this is that the breakage of language is subjective and is 
contingent upon who is doing the analysis. Supposing A 
is our analyst and she has the shared knowledge with B 
that C is a dishonest person, then B’s seemingly maxim-
flouting response is perfectly sensible. For her, language 
has not broken, as she is privy to certain information, and 
thus language remains firmly in the domain of the ready-
to-hand. On the other hand, however, if we are to affirm 
our analysis above—that is to say, an extra-conversational 
analysis—then it seems as if language has broken and 
becomes present-at-hand. While there may certainly be 
odd ontological implications of such a superposition of 
language, I both cannot see them at the moment and do 
not have the spatial luxury to examine them. As such, they 
must be bracketed. 
Ultimately, while there are some linguistic 
interactions that fall outside the scope of the 
Heideggerian-Gricean analysis (instances of sarcasm, for 
example) that may require significant amounts of mental 
calorie burning to subsume under the theory, viewing 
language as a tool is, itself, a tool. While the ‘tool-
theory’ of language will no doubt need to be augmented 
with additional qualifications to cover a wider range 
of linguistic practices and extenuating circumstances, 
I believe that it can both serve as a foundation for 
understanding ways in which conversations and language 
generally work and begin to crack to the shell of our fixed 
ontology.
